INTRODUCTION
Interlocking directorates, or management interlocks, are a form of structural links between companies occurring when firms directly or indirectly share a common board director or officer. 1 A widespread practice in many economies around the world, 2 interlocks, in and of themselves, are not necessarily harmful to competition, and indeed can produce procompetitive benefits. 3 Nevertheless, serious risks can arise when interlocks involve competitors because of their potential to facilitate collusion or otherwise contribute to the establishment or maintenance of tacit or oligopolistic coordination. 4 These competitive concerns raise particular enforcement challenges in small and emerging economies, which are often highly concentrated and tend to have weaker self-correcting tendencies than in larger economies. 5 At the same time, scarcity of enforcement resources makes policing these practices more difficult. 6 The example of Chile illustrates the challenges facing these jurisdictions. Management interlocks appear to be such common occurrences in important sectors of the Chilean economy, including in the health care market, 7 that the National Economic Prosecutor's Office (Fiscalía Nacional Económica or "FNE") recently undertook a study on the issue and how anticompetitive interlocks might be addressed under the Competition Act. 8 Chile-like the vast majority of Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development ("OECD") countries-does not explicitly address the practice in its antitrust laws and is thus left to deal with anticompetitive interlocks ex ante during merger reviews, 9 or ex post under its general competition statute. 10 In one recent example, the FNE confronted an interlock while reviewing the acquisition of a department store chain by one of Chile's largest retail conglomerates. The FNE ultimately decided not to initiate a "consultation" before the Competition Tribunal (Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia or "TDLC") after the acquired chain agreed to eliminate ties-one of which involved common directors-with another retail competitor. 11 While this suggests that Chile's competition authorities might be able to address 6 9. See OECD, Antirust Issues, supra note 1, at 49 ("The majority of cases dealing with interlocking directorates are merger control cases, where the commonality of board members was considered to be a factor facilitating co-ordination between the interlocked firms."); Rosch, supra note 2, at 21-22; Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen et potentially anticompetitive interlocks in certain instances, the approach is inherently limited and (as will be discussed below) not ideally suited to the particular constraints facing competition enforcement there. 12 In contrast to Chile, the antitrust laws in the United States provide a means of tackling anticompetitive interlocks head on. Section 8 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from serving as either a director or a board-elected or -appointed officer of two or more corporations that are direct competitors with one another. 13 Importantly, section 8 has been interpreted as establishing a per se prohibition, so that no anticompetitive effect need be shown to establish a violation. 14 The purpose of this approach is "to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates." 15 At the same time, the statute is quite limited in scope-indeed, some argue too limited-and provides various exceptions that assure that the prohibition does not affect the vast majority of competitively benign interlocks. 16 Like any bright-line standard, "[i]t can be both over-and under-inclusive in particular settings." 17 Nevertheless, as Professor Spencer Waller argues in a recent article on corporate governance and competition law, section 8 represents "an appropriate compromise" that balances error costs and process costs. 18 While Indonesia, Japan, and Korea also address interlocking directorates in their competition laws, the United States is almost unique in adopting a per se ban that does not 12 . In Chile, the problem of addressing potentially anticompetitive interlocks in the context of merger reviews is further complicated by the fact that Chile, at least theoretically, lacks a mandatory pre-merger notification regime.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to corporations that are, "by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws").
14. require any analysis of the competitive effects of an interlock. 19 Despite that fact, and although other jurisdictions have not followed the US model, section 8 of the Clayton Act nevertheless provides an extremely useful template for countries like Chile (and other small, emerging economies that already have developed competition institutions) to begin addressing anticompetitive interlocks. While legal transplants from one jurisdiction to another "can be unsuccessful and even harmful if they do not deal effectively with the special characteristics of the following jurisdiction," 20 in this case, it is precisely because the harmful effects of competitor interlocks may be especially acute in economies characterized by tight oligopolies that the adoption of a limited prophylactic measure is particularly advisable. Moreover, because competition regimes in emerging jurisdictions may benefit from adopting simple and predictable standards over complex rules that seek to examine all of the complexities that might be associated with a particular practice, 21 the approach of section 8 is also well-suited.
In arguing for the advantages of the US model, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I begins by briefly discussing the potential competitive effects of management interlocks. Part II then looks at the special characteristics of small, emerging economies like Chile's and how, informed by decision theory, those particularities in those jurisdictions might be taken into account when developing rules or standards for addressing interlocks. Part III then looks at how Chile's competition 19 . See Rosch, supra note 2, at 20-21. The competition laws in Indonesia, Japan, and Korea generally require that the market impact of specific interlocks be considered. Id authorities have addressed interlocks, while Part IV, in turn, contrasts that with the US experience under section 8 of the Clayton Act, including some recent enforcement efforts. As will become apparent in this discussion, the US model not only provides an easily administrable approach for dealing with interlocks between competitors, it also provides the needed flexibility to address competitive concerns that enforcers might not be able to remedy effectively in the absence of the statute. Finally, Part V considers the relative costs and benefits of the US approach towards management interlocks, and whether more finely-tuned alternatives might be preferable, and concludes that the US model fulfills what a decision-theoretic framework would recommend as an optimal approach for an economy like Chile's.
The precise reach of any per se prohibition-whether implemented through a statutory amendment or by means of judicial rulings-would need to take into account any increased risks from the practice in a particular context, and some of the recognized weaknesses of section 8 surely could be improved upon. Moreover, to the extent an absolute ban does not reach particular instances that in fact turn out to be harmful (i.e., false negatives), those might still be addressed as they are currently, during merger review or under the general provisions of the competition laws. Nevertheless, the fundamental point remains: an absolute ban on those interlocks most likely to be anticompetitive (i.e., those involving direct competitors) is an optimal solution for small and emerging economies.
I. THE POTENTIAL COMPETITIVE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF MANAGEMENT INTERLOCKS
Minority shareholdings and interlocking directorates are mechanisms through which structural links may be established between competitors. As noted above, management interlocks involve situations in which one or more persons have executive responsibilities in two or more companies, and sometimes involve companies that are in horizontal or vertical business relationships. 22 Interlocks are often accompanied by other structural relationships between firms, including minority shareholdings, which raise their own competitive issues. 23 An interlock involving competitors may be either "direct" or "indirect." 24 The former is the most straightforward situation, and occurs when the same individual has executive responsibilities in two separate competing firms (as illustrated in FIGURE 1).
FIGURE 1: Direct Interlock
In contrast, an indirect interlock can take various forms. For instance, in an arrangement sometimes referred to as "deputization," different individuals who represent a single person or corporation serve on the competitors' boards (as illustrated in FIGURE 2). When the individuals, acting in a principal-agent relationship, for instance, represent the same interests on the separate boards, a situation materially the same as a direct horizontal interlock between the competitors can result. A second variation of an indirect interlock involves a person serving as an officer or director of two corporations that do not engage in competition themselves, but which have subsidiaries that compete with one another (as illustrated in FIGURE 3). Louis Brandeis, before his appointment to the US Supreme Court, was an influential voice in the early debates surrounding interlocking directorates, and a critic of the practice. Nearly a century ago, Brandeis famously wrote:
The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine. Applied to rival corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of the Sherman law. Applied to corporations which deal with each other, it tends to disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two masters. 25 Contrary to Brandeis' assertion, though, the competitive impact of interlocks (particularly with respect to some of the forms described above) is not so clear cut, and a number of potential benefits from management interlocks have been identified in the economics literature. The most common justification relates to the ability of firms to obtain the services of knowledgeable and experienced directors. 26 Within a particular industry, the number of qualified candidates may be small, and engaging in an interlock may be necessary to allow firms to tap into the limited talent pool. 27 In addition, firms may use management interlocks to co-opt sources of supply dependency, thereby assuring themselves access to resources necessary for their business operations. 28 Moreover, interlocks may lend the legitimacy and prestige necessary for a firm to obtain financial resources. 29 As one commentator has suggested:
Interlocks in some sense provide the best of both worlds with respect to inside and outside directors: An interlocked director has the ability to perform the monitoring function of an outside director, while-like an inside directorproviding a high level of expertise (albeit not the firmspecific expertise that an internal manager can provide). 30 Apart from potential corporate governance benefits, however, direct and indirect interlocks can bring with them certain risks, 31 31. In addition to the potential competitive risks, a number of principal-agent issues have also been associated with management interlocks. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 3, at 112 ("If managers are acting in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the corporation's shareholders, interlocks can be problematic."); Waller, supra note 3, at 857-58 (noting that interlocks "can exacerbate the agency cost problems when a director's decisions can benefit his interests in his other role with the competitor rather than serve the best interests of the shareholders at the company competitors. As an initial matter, interlocks could be used to facilitate outright collusion. 32 " [W] hen an individual simultaneously serves as an officer or director of two competing companies, he or she stumbles into a prime opportunity for collusion-for example, coordination of pricing, marketing, or production plans of the two companies." 33 This is certainly not to suggest that interlocks involving "competitors" invariably will lead to collusive behavior, and indeed there is debate in the economics literature as to whether such interlocks result in meaningfully higher levels of collusion. 34 Nevertheless, collusive conduct is often difficult and costly to detect, and when it does occur, can impose significant social costs. 35 Even the possibility that interlocks could result in collusion, therefore, should be taken very seriously.
where he serves as a director"). cost-benefit analysis of cartel penalties, a "relatively high 25% to 30% probability that cartels will be detected"-a probability Connor and Lande characterize as "conservative").
Apart from outright collusion, management interlocks may facilitate tacit collusion or other means of oligopolistic coordination through anticompetitive exchanges of sensitive information regarding sales and prices, product design, and firm strategy. 36 These exchanges may make it easier for economic actors to reach common understandings regarding future behavior, 37 and also help firms more readily detect deviations by others, thus lessening any incentive to deviate. 38 Like outright collusion, tacit coordination can be difficult to detect, and even when it is discovered, proscribing the conduct can present its own challenges depending on the particular legal rules that apply. Other risks identified with horizontal interlocks include foreclosure of rivals, while perceived risks of vertical interlocks include preferential treatment of suppliers or customers through reciprocal or exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and vertical integration. 39 
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF SMALL ECONOMIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DESIGNING RULES OR STANDARDS TO ADDRESS ANTICOMPETITIVE INTERLOCKS
When considering the appropriate standard or rule to adopt with respect to interlocking directorates, it is important to take into account the potential harms and benefits described above. Whatever approach is adopted ideally would proscribe those interlocks that are harmful, while permitting those that are beneficial (or at least competitively benign). In other words, the standard would minimize error costs associated with false 36 . See Waller, supra note 3, at 858; see also Gabrielsen et If you have more detailed information on the rival's most valuable customers and products (the highest price-cost margin), your deviation can be targeted towards those segments and thereby become more profitable. In that respect, it destabilises co-ordination. At the same time, such information will make it possible for the firms to directly target certain customers group, which typically leads to tougher competition after any deviation. According to this effect, information exchange may lead to a more stable co-ordinated outcome.
Id.
39. OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 49.
negatives (i.e., failure to condemn anticompetitive conduct) as well as false positives (i.e., condemnations of competitive conduct). Increased precision, though, which tends to require more complicated market analyses, brings with it higher process costs. A full "rule of reason" analysis of management interlocks (balancing the anticompetitive harms of the practice in particular cases with any precompetitive benefits) therefore may have low error costs, in that it would tend to accurately identify and condemn only anticompetitive instances, but would bring with it high process costs. A bright-line per se rule, in contrast, would have low process costs but may have higher error costs. Decision theory provides a useful framework for determining optimal legal rules or standards in a particular context. 40 As "a process for making factual determinations and decisions when information is costly and therefore imperfect," 41 decision theory helps to determine, among other things, how much information, and what kinds, should be gathered and considered in arriving at a decision in a manner that accounts for both error costs and process costs. 42 Following this approach, the pertinent questions to be considered when designing a rule or standard to address a particular category of conduct are: (1) how frequently pro-competitive (versus anti-competitive) uses of that conduct are encountered; (2) what is the magnitude of any benefit (versus harms) from that conduct; and (3) whether, given unavoidable error costs, 43 42. See id. at 44 ("Every decision maker faced with imperfect information must resolve three related questions. First, assuming that a decision must be made with imperfect information, what is the optimal decision? Second, how much information should the decision maker gather and consider in making a decision? Third, if information is to be gathered, exactly which information should be considered and in what order?").
43. As US Supreme Court Justice Breyer noted, economic theory suggests that even horizontal price-fixing could be more beneficial than "unfettered competition" balance, "generally improve consumer welfare and administration of the [competition] laws." 44 In short, the designer must balance error and process costs.
The insights from decision theory also lead to the important conclusion that it is not enough simply to assume that an approach that works in one country will necessarily function in another. As Professor Michal S. Gal, a leading scholar on competition law in small economies, has cautioned: "the special characteristics of some economies may change the optimal rules because they affect the relative size of process and/or error costs." 45 For instance, Chile's economy is characterized by tight oligopolies and by high barriers to entry in important sectors. 46 Moreover, in smaller economies, the "invisible hand" is less likely to lead to market self-correction than in larger ones, 47 each other's domains. 48 In this context, the error costs associated with not preventing anti-competitive interlocks (false negatives) are likely to be appreciably higher than in larger economies. 49 At the same time, given the smaller pool of available business talent, the error costs of not allowing benign or beneficial interlocks may also be somewhat higher. Those facts, if true, would need to be taken into account in formulating a standard.
Additionally, particularities with respect to process costs also need to be taken into consideration. In small jurisdictions like Chile, scarcity of enforcement resources is a significant issue, and will likely continue to be an issue even as Chile's wealth continues on its upward trajectory. 50 Application of complex rules that seek to map the intricacies of economic theories may make sense in larger, developed jurisdictions where, because of the expertise and sheer resources of the enforcement institutions, error costs are often low. In a more resource constrained environment, however, enforcement agencies will suffer from a more limited ability to perform the necessary analysis. 51 It is not a given in these circumstances that the increased process costs of pursuing a more complex rule will reduce the error costs associated with a simpler rule. Moreover, those resources expended in enforcing the more complex rule (which may or may not reduce error costs) also translate into lower levels of overall enforcement. Those trade-offs should also be taken into account in formulating an approach. 52 Based on this discussion, a few observations are in order regarding an appropriate standard for management interlocks in the Chilean context in particular (and more broadly, for other small and emerging economies).
First, management interlocks are not intrinsically problematic; rather, only certain interlocks pose such problems. 48 . Id. at 1448. 49. Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 837 ("Minority share ownership, interlocking directorships and other links between competitors have been something of a headache in competition law for decades. This is particularly so in oligopolistic markets, where the anti-competitive effect of various forms of structural links may be particularly visible.").
50. Gal, supra note 6, at 421. 51. Id. at 435. 52. See id. at 437.
Therefore, the standard cannot be too restrictive such that it unduly restricts those instances in which interlocks would be beneficial or otherwise competitively benign. Second, the standard must nevertheless recognize that a certain subset of interlocks-those that either directly or indirectly involve competitors-have a significant potential for causing serious harm, and therefore are worthy of some kind of enforcement activity.
Third, given the nature of Chile's economy, it would be preferable to err on the side of caution with respect to competitively suspect interlocks. The error costs of false negatives, which could result in cartelization or the softening of competition in oligopolistic markets, are potentially enormous. On the other hand, the costs of false positives (foregone benefits described in the prior section) are small in comparison. Indeed, the asymmetry seems so large that even if only some fraction of competitor interlocks results in actual harm, the balance would still favor a bias towards preventing false negatives.
Fourth, given relatively low error costs of false positives on the margins, the process costs of engaging in additional inquiry, through a rule of reason, to eliminate those instances would have to be very low to be worthwhile.
Fifth, whatever net benefits might be obtainable by engaging in a refined analysis of suspect interlocks must be weighed against the impact on overall enforcement efforts by an agency with limited resources. 53 As will be described in the following parts, section 8 of the Clayton Act-which adopts a relatively bright-line rule that is also limited in reach-provides a reasonable model for satisfying these considerations. 53 . The most recent annual budget for the FNE was around US$8.6 million, for a country with a population of around 16.6 million. By contrast, the budget for Canada's Competition Bureau, for a country just over twice the size, with 35.2 million inhabitants, was around US$41.9 million. See Rating Enforcement 2013, GLOBAL COMPETITION REV., available at http://globalcompetitionreview.com/surveys/survey/ 828/rating-enforcement-2013/.
III. TREATMENT OF INTERLOCKS BY CHILE'S COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
As noted above, the Chilean competition authorities have addressed situations in which interlocks (and other structural links, such as minority shareholdings) have raised competitive concerns. 54 The mechanism used in these instances is similar to that most commonly employed in the European Union and other jurisdictions that do not have specific provisions in their competition laws dealing with interlocks. Often, this occurs during the merger review process-a fact that complicates the situation in Chile even further given that the country does not have a mandatory pre-merger notification system.
Chile's Competition Act establishes a broad prohibition against individual or collective acts or agreements "that impede, restrict or hinder competition, or that tend to produce such effects." 55 This general statement is then followed by descriptions of typical behaviors that can harm competition, including express or tacit agreements among competitors that confer market power, 56 abuses of dominance by a single actor or group of actors, 57 and predatory practices or unfair competition with the objective of obtaining, maintaining, or increasing a dominant position. 58 The important point, however, is that this list is non-exhaustive, 59 and therefore the prohibition set forth in 54. FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 45. The first cases dealing with structural links between competitors were considered by the Comisiones Resolutivas (predecessors to TDLC), although these generally dealt with minority ownership interests, not management interlocks. Article 3 allows for the Competition Act to reach all types of conduct, whether individual or collective, that not only harms competition but that also might tend to do so. Thus, to the extent that management interlocks pose risks to competition that are not counterbalanced by significant efficiencies, they should be subject to oversight by Chile's competition enforcement institutions, notwithstanding the lack of any specific mention of the practice in the Competition Act itself. 60 Prior to the establishment of the TDLC in 2004, the only instance in which the predecessor competition commissions directly addressed the potential effects of interlocks arose in the context of a complaint by Celulosa Arauco y Constitución S.A. (Arauco) against Carter Holt Harvey, two competitors in Chile's important forestry products industry. 61 Arauco complained that its main competitor sought to place one of its representatives on the Arauco board in order to gain access to confidential business information, including strategic plans. 62 Notwithstanding the apparent competitive risks, the Commission dismissed the complaint because it concluded that Arauco-given a complex ownership structure-was actually a subsidiary of Carter Holt as a result of a prior acquisition by the latter of a fifty percent interest in an investment company that owned Arauco. 63 The Commission concluded that the right of the company to place a representative on the Arauco board simply flowed from its capacity as a parent company. 64 The earlier Carter Holt transaction was not itself questioned, highlighting the particular risks that can arise with respect to addressing interlocks when a jurisdiction, like Chile, does not have a mandatory pre-merger notification system in place.
The TDLC itself first imposed conditions implicating management interlocks in the context of authorizing a merger competition or that might tend to produce such effects," before setting forth the examples just described. Corp. S.A., another major Chilean department store chain. The result was not a direct interlock but rather an indirect one. While Johnson's limited position in the market led the FNE to rule out unilateral risks to competition from the transaction, there was a concern that the connection with Ripley created risks of coordinated conduct. As the FNE noted:
From the point of view of competition, the connections that would exist between two companies, either through ownership or administrative links with each other, may be the subject of condemnation primarily because of the possibility of relevant and sensitive information flowing between them, facilitating, principally, the possibility of coordination between two economically independent companies. Furthermore, these relationships may reduce the competitive pressure between the two entities with ownership or management intertwined. 68 In order to address the FNE's concerns and to decrease the chances of coordinated action between Ripley and Cencosud, the two companies established a series of measures, which included a commitment by the minority shareholders in Johnson's not to participate in the management and administration of Johnson's or any other company in the Cencosud group, as long as they maintained their holdings in Ripley. 69 A second instance raising concerns about anticompetitive interlocks involved the wood pulp market and arose in the course of an investigation of an alleged market allocation agreement between competitors in that market. 70 During the investigation, the FNE became aware of the existence of a minority interest (11.03%) by the Matte Group in Copec S.A., an investment that allowed Bernardo Matte Larrain to be named to the company's board. This resulted in structural and personal links between CMPC Celulose (on whose board Matte also served) and Copec S.A., the parent company (with a 99.9% interest) of Arauco y Constitución S.A., the only national 68 competitor of CMPC Celulose in the relevant market. 71 Despite this link, the agency did not pursue the investigation further because it was unable to establish the existence of a market allocation agreement. 72 While the presence of common directors and ownership links between firms might have been considered as a "plus-factor," the FNE found that these structures were insufficient by themselves to establish the existence of such an agreement between competitors. 73 While the general nature of Chile's Competition Act allows the country's competition authorities to deal with interlocks in a variety of contexts, the available tools nevertheless appear to be inadequate to deal appropriately with the many types of structural links between competitors that may cause competitive risks. Even if Chilean law allows for potentially anticompetitive interlocks to be reviewed without a "change of control" (as in some other jurisdictions), the absence of a mandatory notification system prior to the establishment of such links suggests that, in most instances, these interlocks will be detected only after they already have been constituted, as was the situation in some of the cases described above. Furthermore, when considered merely as "plus factors" in the context of an investigation into collusive conduct, the focus is no longer on the risks that interlocks can pose with respect to coordination, but instead shifts to whether the burden of proof for collusion has been satisfied in a particular instance. Neither approach appears to be well suited to addressing, in the context of a small economy with concentrated markets, anticompetitive interlocks with the goal of preventing anticompetitive harms from materializing in the first place.
71. Id. 72. Id. 73. Id. Following this case, and in the presence of this regulatory vacuum, the FNE's Research Division was asked to undertake the preparation of a document identifying the possible measures that could be taken against management interlocks and other structural links between competitors that increase the risk of facilitating coordination or conscious parallelism but that may not themselves constitute an anticompetitive agreement. See FNE, Minority Shareholdings, supra note 8, at 89.
IV. CLAYTON ACT SECTION 8: AN APPROPRIATE COMPROMISE BETWEEN ACCURACY AND ADMINISTRABILIT
The US approach to dealing with potentially problematic management interlocks dates back to 1914 with the enactment of section 8 of the Clayton Act. 74 The statute provides in relevant part:
No person 75 shall, at the same time, serve as a director or officer in any two corporations (other than banks, banking associations, and trust companies 76 ) that are . . . by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws77 . . . if each of the corporations has capital, surplus, and undivided profits aggregating more than $10,000,000 as adjusted pursuant to paragraph (5) of this subsection 78 [currently US$23,883,000 79 ].
74. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that concerns about "[i]nterlocking directorates became such a hot-button political issue in the 1912 [presidential] election that all three political party platforms called for legislation to address the subject").
75. The Clayton Act defines "person" to include "corporations":
The word "person" or "persons" wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign country. 15 U.S.C. § 12(a) (2012 80 Section 8 has generated remarkably little jurisprudence during its nearly one hundred-year history. 81 That is likely the result of the federal courts having adopted a per se construction of section 8, which allows a violation to be established with no proof of actual anticompetitive effects from the management interlock. Moreover, "pragmatic" court decisions involving other issues arising under the statute-including the definition of "competitors" and whether the statute reaches "indirect" interlocks-have further contributed to the ability of section 8 to reach various manifestations of anticompetitive interlocks. 81. Rosch, supra note 2, at 17.
Combined with the 1990 amendments, these appear to have struck a reasonable balance that generally tends to allow beneficial or benign interlocks, but does so in a manner that avoids making enforcement unreasonably costly.
A. The Per Se Approach to Finding Violations of Section 8
The per se approach dates back to a 1953 district court ruling in United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 82 the "first judicial construction" of section 8 since its enactment in 1914. In Sears, the defendant argued that the 'so that' clause of section 8 required a showing that a hypothetical merger between the two firms would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, 83 which prohibits mergers between firms only when "the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly." 84 The court, however, rejected the defendant's argument and instead held that the statute applied when a possible agreement (for instance, on prices) between the interlocked parties would contravene "any of the provisions of any of the antitrust laws." 85 In short, it concluded that a straightforward per se test-under which liability turned on whether or not the two firms were or had been competitorswas the proper one.
Administrability considerations were important factors in the court's decision to adopt a per se rule in Sears. Examining the legislative history of section 8, it concluded that "[t]he legislation was essentially preventative," and that the defendant's position "would defeat the Congressional purpose 'to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies and monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation. ' The per se rule, in contrast, "permits the prohibitory features of § 8 to be administered with the full scope which the legislators must have contemplated." 88 The US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in Protectoseal Co. v. Barancik, similarly concluded that it did "not believe Congress intended the legality of an interlock to depend on the kind of complex evidence that may be required in a protracted case arising under § 7." 89 As in Sears, the defendant in Protectoseal argued that a violation of section 8 could not occur unless a merger of the two companies would be unlawful under section 7. In rejecting that position, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the relevant language of Section 8 "establishes rather simple objective criteria for judging the legality of the interlock," and that "a market-wide analysis of competition [was] unnecessary" under the statute. 90 In 1990, the US Congress debated whether the section 7 standard, which had been rejected by the courts, should be applied to interlocks under section 8. 91 The US Congress further recognized that these higher enforcement costs would mean that "the interlock prohibition would effectively be nullified in all but the most egregious situations." 93 Thus, the bright-line standard was retained as the most appropriate approach given the prophylactic nature of section 8, even as per se approaches were being jettisoned in other areas of US antitrust jurisprudence around this time. 94 In contrast to the United States, Japan has adopted the very standard that was rejected for section 8 by precluding interlocks only when "the effect of such an interlocking directorate may be substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade." 95 Unlike with the Clayton Act, the focus of the Japanese Antimonopoly Act is not on whether there is simply an interlock between competitors. 96 Rather, the focus is entirely on the effects of the restraint. Korea and Indonesia also follow similar be allowed to merge under the standard set forth in section 7 of the Clayton Act. ' Neither an officer nor an employee (meaning in this article a person other than officers engaged in the business of a company on a regular basis) of a company shall hold at the same time a position as an officer of another company where the effect of such an interlocking directorate may be substantially to restrain competition in any particular field of trade.
Id.
approaches, and in all three cases, the requirement that there be a showing that the interlock would have an actual effect on competition results in an enforcement burden not present with section 8.
B. Identification of "Competitors" and Other Issues in Applying the US Standard
With the adoption of a per se approach in the United States, one of the core remaining questions under section 8 has been whether two corporations are "competitors" with one another within the meaning of the statute. In answering that question, some courts have applied the market definition analyses used under the Sherman and Clayton Acts more generally. 98 Other courts, however, have not restricted themselves to using "quantitative market definition analysis typically applied in Clayton Act Section 7 merger cases," but rather have employed a more flexible "qualitative analysis" as well. 99 As with the rejection of an effects analysis, concerns with respect to administrability and the policy objectives of section 8 underlie these decisions as well.
The (1) Can the two products (the defendant's and the substitute) be said to compete because they are reasonably interchangeable with respect to the uses to which they can be put? (2) Are the two products actually competitive because there is a high crosselasticity of demand on the part of customers? 515 F. Supp. 977, 980-81 (D. Md. 1981).
99. Gerber, supra note 3, at 108; see ABA ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 428.
identifying "competitors" for purposes of section 8. 100 In TRW, the petitioner-defendants argued that whether they were "competitors" should be judged by the standards of crosselasticity of demand and reasonable interchangeability of use of their products. 101 The Court of Appeals, however, rejected the defendants' position and concluded that the prophylactic purposes underlying section 8 "would not be well served" by such a requirement. 102 The Ninth Circuit gave two principal reasons for its conclusion. First, such an inquiry is not conceptually necessary given that section 8 only requires that "two alleged 'competitors'
[be] involved and proof that the interlock has an actual anticompetitive effect is not required." 103 Second, the Ninth Circuit considered the defendants' proposed standard to be "too restrictive." 104 For instance, "while the tests of crosselasticity of demand and interchangeability of use may yield realistic results in well-established industries," the court noted that they are much less useful in evolving markets still in their "infancy." 105 Thus, it concluded that in order to further the purpose of the statute, it was also appropriate to consider evidence concerning:
(1) the extent to which the industry and its customers recognize the products as separate or competing; (2) the extent to which production techniques for the products are similar; and (3) the extent to which the products can be said to have distinctive customers. 106 The Ninth Circuit's "qualitative" approach has the potential to increase uncertainty, and perhaps in some instances to raise enforcement costs. The Court of Appeals itself recognized that its approach "may render more difficult the process of screening potential directors for compliance with section 8." 107 extremely costly, 108 and by not requiring such an assessment, enforcement costs are reduced. This goes hand-in-hand with the approach described above eschewing an effects analysis. Moreover, this flexible approach may better facilitate section 8's prophylactic purpose in important sectors of the new economy.
An additional complication with the US approach is whether section 8 reaches not only "direct" interlocks involving competitors, but the various "indirect" interlocks described above. 109 The Department of Justice ("DOJ") and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") both have taken the position that a violation of section 8 may occur when different individuals, representing a single person or corporation, serve on boards of competitors (as illustrated in FIGURE 2 above). 110 This makes 108 . See Gerber, supra note 3, at 131 (noting that "even absent a requirement of anticompetitive effect, the cost of quantitative market definition remains a valid concern").
109. Preminger argues that "[w]hat scant legislative history exists supports the contention that Congress did not intend section 8 to extend to interlocks other than the more blatant, direct forms that come within the literal meaning of the statute." Preminger, supra note 85, at 951. To the extent that is the case, that may have been a function of the fact that "[w]hen the Clayton Act was written the Congress had no experience with legislation about interlocking directorates. The provisions of the statute were apparently designed to cope with the problems that had become most conspicuous during the two previous decades." FED. TRADE COMM'N, REPORT ON sense since the same concerns regarding information exchange between competitors can arise regardless of whether the same individual serves in an executive capacity with two firms, or whether the interlock is accomplished with two or more people. 111 A federal district court reached a similar conclusion in Reading International v. Oaktree Capital Management LLC, a case involving a private equity firm that had significant ownership interests in two competing movie theater chains. 112 In Reading, the equity firm's president served on the board of one of the theater chains, while a principal of the firm was a board member of the other chain. 113 On the defendant's motion to dismiss, the district court rejected the argument that section 8 could only apply to an individual serving simultaneously on two competitors' boards. Rather, the court concluded that the plaintiffs could prevail by establishing that the directors' service on the competitors' boards was not in their individual capacities, but rather "as the deputies of [the private equity firm], acting as the puppets or instrumentalities of the corporation's will, such that it can legitimately be said "that it is the [firm] as an entity . information by competitors," would be ill-served by such a cramped reading. 115 With respect to other configurations of indirect interlocks, including situations in which a person serves as an officer or director of two corporations that are not themselves competitors, but that involve subsidiaries (as illustrated in FIGURES 3 & 4 above), both the DOJ and the FTC have taken enforcement actions premised on such indirect interlocks. 116 In Borg-Warner Corp., for instance, the FTC concluded that the relevant inquiry under section 8 in these circumstances is whether the parent company should be regarded as a "competitor" of the subsidiary's competitors, and whether an interlocked director is so placed as to be able to exercise control or even to substantially influence decision-making at the director level so as to dampen competitive relationships between divided corporate interests. 117 Federal courts, however, have split on this question. In United States v. Crocker National Corp., the Ninth Circuit concluded that when a parent "substantially controls the policies 1975) . The district court, on a motion for summary judgment, did not reject the government's theory as a matter of law (though it noted that the question was "entirely unsettled"), but declined to grant the motion because of significant factual questions that remained. Id. at 712. In Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's section 8 claim based on a representative theory, but did so because the record before the court included only "conclusory allegations" that deputization had occurred." 828 F.2d 211, 217 (4th Cir. 1987). The appellate court did not reject the theory as a matter of law. For a discussion of how "deputization" and parent-subsidiary interlocks were "often used successfully to sidestep the express restrictions of [section 8]," thereby threatening the purpose of the statute, see Preminger, supra note 85, at 945. . 1984) . In Borg-Warner, the FTC challenged an interlock resulting from the acquisition of Borg-Warner stock by Bosch GmbH, a German corporation. Two directors sitting simultaneously on the boards of Bosch GmbH and Bosch U.S., the German company's wholly-owned American subsidiary, assumed positions on Borg-Warner's board. The theory espoused in the FTC complaint was that the arrangement constituted an illegal interlock insofar as Bosch U.S. competed directly with Borg-Warner. Id.
of its subsidiary," the "business and location" of the parent includes that of the subsidiary as well. 118 In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., overturned the "general rule" adopted by the district court that section 8 prohibits interlocking directorates between parent companies with subsidiaries that are competitors, 119 though that ruling may be limited by its facts and is not necessarily inconsistent with the pragmatic approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit.
In contrast to section 8, the Japanese Antimonopoly Act does not appear to concern itself whatsoever with whether "competitors" are involved in the interlock. 120 The result is that Japan's approach may be more expansive than the Clayton Act, which has been held to apply only to interlocking directorates between horizontal competitors, 121 whereas the Japanese act conceivably could reach even vertical interlocks that affect competition. 122 The Japanese approach, in theory, also relieves enforcers of the burden of establishing that the parties involved are competitors. It seems unlikely, however, that the overall enforcement burden under the Japanese approach, with a requirement of showing possible effects, would be less than in the United States, where "competitors" can be (at least in some courts) established using a "qualitative" approach. 123 118 122. While interlocks between suppliers and customers are not reached by section 8, in theory, these could raise competitive concerns. As the OECD has noted, these arrangements "traditionally have been criticized on the ground that they can lead to preferential treatment at the expense of other suppliers or customers by facilitating reciprocal or exclusive dealing, tying arrangements, and vertical integration." See OECD, Antitrust Issues, supra note 1, at 49.
123. By its own terms, section 8 has some important limitations that prevent it from reaching certain competitor interlocks that nevertheless could raise concerns. For instance, the statute applies only to officers or directors, not employees or agents, even though interlocks involving the latter could also result in information exchanges or other anticompetitive harms. Furthermore, section 8 only applies to officers or directors of corporations, but not of other types of business entities, such as partnerships. See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1262 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that Section 8 does not apply to sports leagues). Moreover, the statute probably does not reach interlocks in which individuals from competing corporations sit on a board of a
C. Recent Experiences Demonstrate the Benefits of the US Model
The relatively low-cost and on-balance predictable nature of the bright-line rule for interlocks in the United States translates into some real benefits with respect to enforcement, which are particularly important when considering emerging economies in which agency resources are (in relative terms) scarce. Section 8 can be enforced by the DOJ, the FTC, or by private parties, and in theory, remedies in private actions theoretically could include treble damages, although there do not appear to be any instances in which monetary awards have been given. 124 Rather, when disputes arise, the typical remedy involves the resignation of a director from one of the two corporations, 125 or sometimes the divestiture of a business line so the firms are no longer competitors, and, thus, no longer subject to the statute's prohibitions. 126 non-competing company, or interlocks involving family members or close friends, even though, again, these forms could also lead to anticompetitive results. See Rosch, supra note 2, at 18. Nevertheless, even when section 8 does not apply, other legal prohibitions may exist regarding management interlocks. For instance, section 305 of the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 825d(b) (2012), prohibits individuals-absent prior authorization from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission-from being an officer or director of more than one public utility or from holding such a position with a public utility and a company that may underwrite or market public utility securities. 124. See ABA, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 77, at 430. 125. Under the statute, a person who becomes ineligible to serve as an officer or director of a competitor due to some intervening event has a one-year grace period from the time of that event in which they can continue in that position. See 15 U.S.C. § 19(b).
126. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 131.
The federal government rarely sues under section 8. 127 In fact, the most recent contested case brought by the government, Borg-Warner, was filed thirty-five years ago. 128 While this may be due in part to section 8 enforcement having experienced "periods of benign neglect" over its history, 129 in recent years both the DOJ and FTC have addressed management interlocks-with the FTC having pursued a particularly highprofile matter involving Google and Apple. 130 Rather, the dearth of section 8 litigation is more likely attributable to government enforcement having become largely "administrative" in nature. As Judge Easterbrook recently described that process, "[w]hen the [DOJ] or the FTC concludes that directorships improperly overlap, it notifies the firm and gives it a chance to avoid litigation (or to convince the enforcers that the interlock is lawful). 131. Crowley, 687 F.3d at 319. Indeed, this "administrative" approach appears to have been the norm for a far longer period, as one commentator describes the process in an article from 1950:
The Department of Justice's extra-judicial procedure for wholesale enforcement of Section 8 is a novel antitrust enforcement technique. It has been customary to correct alleged violations by instituting lawsuits. But if enforcement by administrative persuasion accomplishes the objectives of the statute, that method would seem to be not only in the public interest but also in the interests of the persons whose directorships are questioned since it gives them an opportunity to resign without publicity and its attendant unpleasantness . . . . In Section 8 matters, the relief is simple and specific: resignation from all but one of the boards of the competing corporations.
as "competitors" or whether the statute applies to a particular "indirect" interlock, the legal analysis under section 8 (as described above) is otherwise generally quite straightforwardsomething that could not necessarily be said under an effects standard. 132 Because of the per se standard followed by the courts, the likely outcome is more certain and predictable. Moreover, if a violation of section 8 has occurred, the investigated corporations usually can resolve the matter at relatively low cost, with the resignation of a board member or divestiture of a line of business. DOJ because, the agency concluded, CommScope and Andes were each other's closest competitors for many customers. The rights would thus give CommScope "both the incentive and the ability to coordinate its activities with those of Andes, and/or to undermine Andes' ability to compete on price and innovation." 136 To ameliorate those concerns, the DOJ required the parties-as a condition to its approval of the transaction-to renounce their governance rights, including CommScope's right to appoint members of Andes' board. 137 Even in jurisdictions that do not follow the US model, it may be possible to analyze the potential competitive effect of management interlocks during merger reviews. As noted above, Chile's competition authorities have been able to address the practice in certain instances, even though the Competition Act does not specifically address interlocking directorates. 138 In the European context, however, it has been noted that that law does not address the issue "in a coherent way," and consequently "minority shareholdings, cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorships have been allowed to develop in a wide range of markets." 139 In Chile, which does not have a comprehensive merger regulation like the European Union, the regulatory gap for dealing with questionable interlocks during the merger review process can be expected to be even greater. From an enforcement perspective, relying on merger reviews for addressing potentially anticompetitive interlocks does not appear to be an optimal solution, producing too many false negatives.
Apart from interlocks that arise in connection with mergers, however, competitive concerns can also arise in situations that do not involve reviewable transactions, such as 136. Id. at 8. 137. Id. at 10. In the context of EU merger reviews, divestiture or reduction of minority ownership interests outside of the transaction under review have been offered and accepted by the Commission in various cases. See Gabrielsen et al., supra note 9, at 846. This demonstrates some flexibility in terms of the merger review process being able to address management interlocks that may not have arisen from the merger itself. However, as discussed below, there are other instances of management interlocks that could not be reached under this mechanism.
138. Again, in jurisdictions like Chile that do not follow the US model, it might be possible to reach interlocks arising outside of the merger context under the substantive competition laws. 145 Without section 8 as an available option, however, it does not seem likely that resolution of the competitive concerns arising from the Google-Apple interlock would have been possible, at least not at such an early stage or in an equally efficient manner. This is seen in the Chilean examples described above, where competitively-suspect interlocks have been allowed to remain. In contrast, the FTC was able to intervene in the Google-Apple matter at an early stage, before the interlock presumably could have resulted in any actual violation of the substantive laws or caused any anticompetitive harm. That is precisely what section 8 is intended to prevent. Moreover, the FTC was able to address the interlock without the need to satisfy the more rigorous requirements of a substantive violation-a far more costly proposition for the agency. 146 Under an alternative model that relies on higher-stakes litigation, the benefits of section 8's "administrative" enforcement might not materialize.
V. THE LOW COST, ADMINISTRABLE APPROACH OF SECTION 8 PROVIDES A SUITABLE TEMPLATE FOR SMALL AND EMERGING ECONOMIES
As described above, section 8 is a "limited" provision, and one that is largely prophylactic in nature. The statute identifies an area of potential competitive concern-management interlocks-and establishes a ban on the practice, but only as to those interlocks involving competing corporations, which carry the greatest anticompetitive risks. Rather than inquire about the competitive effects of an interlock by considering whether a combination of the companies involved would violate section 7 (as some defendants had argued), the courts in Sears and Protectoseal opted for a far more administrable per se approach. 147 But, the statute itself then only applies to interlocks between competitors that exceed a certain threshold in terms of "capital, surplus, and undivided profits," 148 thereby eliminating from coverage interlocks that are unlikely to have market-wide anticompetitive effects. Moreover, the additional exemptions enacted in 1990, which exclude from section 8 interlocks that are likely to have de minimis competitive effects, further refine the statute's scope.
The sanctions for a violation of section 8 are also, as a practical matter, "limited." As mentioned earlier, the typical remedy involves the resignation of a director from one of the two corporations, or sometimes the divestiture of a business line so the firms are no longer competitors, and thus no longer subject to section 8's prohibitions. 149 And while private plaintiffs theoretically could recover damages, there do not appear to be any instances in which that has occurred. 150 Thus, given the relatively low stakes involved, combined with the general clarity of the per se rule, enforcement of section 8 has tended to follow the "amicable" path described by Judge Easterbrook-"either avoiding litigation or entering consent decrees contemporaneous with a suit's initiation." 151 Indeed, more than thirty years have elapsed since the last contested Section 8 case brought by the government, notwithstanding continued enforcement efforts described in the prior section.
The US model appears to be capable of satisfying the criteria described above in Part II, and thus would be a reasonable approach for a small, emerging economy like Chile's. An absolute ban on those interlocks involving horizontal competitors-whether imposed by an amendment to the Competition Act or adopted through case law by the TDLC 152 -takes seriously the notion that these carry with them serious risks to competition, particularly in a small economy. It perhaps sweeps more broadly than a more flexible, case-by-case analysis would, and is likely to prohibit some instances of interlocks that might be socially beneficial or otherwise benign. The experience with section 8, however, shows that the number of false positives can be limited by including bright line de minimis exceptions that are properly tailored to their environment. Finally, the US model allows for enforcement to be carried out at relatively low costs.
The potential advantages of the US approach are most apparent in the Matte Group matter discussed above. Recall, despite the structural and personal links between CMPC Celulose and Arauco y Constitución-two competitors in the relevant market-the FNE did not pursue its investigation into a competition law violation because it was unable to establish the existence of a market allocation agreement between the competitors. Regardless of any such agreement in that particular case, however, the existence of such links between competitors generally carries with it significant risks. A direct prohibition against such interlocks would have made it far easier for the FNE to eliminate that risk in this instance-to the extent the mere existence of the prohibition did not result in the dissolution of the links in the first place-at lower costs, either through negotiation with the parties or a simpler proceeding before the TDLC that would largely be limited to establishing the existence of an interlock and the fact that the interlock involved competitors.
Certainly, implementing a bright line in an imprecise manner-either too broadly or narrowly-can create problems from corporate governance and competition perspectives. 153 For instance, an overly-broad application could interfere "unduly with selection of executive talent and deprive[] non-competing corporations of the numerous innocuous (not anticompetitive) benefits that interlocks confer." 154 Conversely, an underinclusive application of the statue might not reach all management interlocks between corporations that actually are meaningful competitors, "such that the statute's intent to prevent collusion is not fully realized." 155 In devising administrable rules, however, it is inevitable that business practices that "sometimes produce benefits" will sometimes be prohibited. 156 As noted above, however, the proper focus is whether on balance the rule is cost-effective. The search for greater precision generally leads to higher enforcement costs, 157 153. See Gerber, supra note 3, at 125-27 (section 8's proscription of interlocking directorates "may in some instances be too broad, restricting corporations that do not meaningfully compete, and in other instances be too narrow, permitting interlocks between corporations that do meaningfully compete"). Gerber points to F. T 157. In the United States, for instance, the practical difference between litigating a bright-line per se case compared to a matter decided under the "rule of reason" is which may or may not be offset by the social benefits of allowing competitively beneficial conduct that otherwise would have been proscribed under the less precise, but more administrable rule. 158 When the US Congress considered-and rejected-a proposal that would have prohibited interlocks only when a merger between the interlocked firms otherwise would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, similar to the Japanese model, it recognized that such a rule would increase enforcement costs substantially, rendering enforcement uneconomical: "We would be most reluctant to expend such resources to determine whether an interlock should be challenged. An interlock does not pose the same degree of anticompetitive potential as a merger . . . . We favor bright line tests for prophylactic rules." 159 There are undoubtedly some questions that arise around the edges under the US approach, such as whether or not certain configurations of interlocks are implicated by the per se banan issue that might be even more problematic in Chile with its economic groups that have interests in wide swaths of the economy. Nevertheless, as argued above, the analysis is substantially less complex than under an "effects" standard and remains consistent with the desired bright line approach.
It might be possible to further refine any prohibition, to reduce the number of false negatives, while remaining faithful to the per se approach courts have followed. Professor Waller, however, convincingly notes that, in the context of interlocks, a "clear 'no'" might be better than a "maybe," especially when viewed ex ante. 160 He also remarks that "further precision would probably come at such a high cost that the incremental gains would not be worthwhile for either competition policy or corporate 158. For an illuminating discussion of how the assignment of burdens of proof and the standards for satisfying those burdens can play an important role in enforcement of the competition laws (in the context of exclusionary discounts), governance." 161 Those costs include not only increased expenses for the government in enforcing the prohibition in specific cases, but also social costs generally if the prophylactic nature of the statute is undermined and an increase in anticompetitive management interlocks results in increased instances of unilateral or coordinated conduct that harms consumers. Moreover, to the extent that specific interlocks that do not fall under the bright-line ban nevertheless raise serious enough competitive concerns so as to infringe the general prohibitions of the competition laws, there appears to be no reason those could not be independently prosecuted in specific cases. Based on the discussion above, Professor Waller's conclusion appears to be a reasonable one. Given the limited nature of a per se ban, with appropriately designed de minimis exceptions, further refinements to such an easily administrable approach probably are not justifiable on a cost-benefit basis. Moreover, it should be recognized that the costs associated with not adopting some kind of reasonable measure to deal with interlocks involving competitors-but instead waiting for a violation of the substantive competition laws-can be high. Former FTC Commissioner Thomas J. Rosch, in a 2009 speech about section 8 enforcement delivered to an audience in Hong Kong, commented on the risk of competitor interlocks, and then went on to caution that "[t]hese concerns have, if anything, only grown in recent years as the government's burden of investigating and litigating price fixing cases has multiplied." 162 Those burdens are the result, at least in part, of massive quantities of electronic communications and other documents that oftentimes must be reviewed and analyzed in connection with a complex antitrust case. They also include the social costs of undetected anticompetitive conduct that is not avoided by means of a reasonable ex ante prohibition. Thus, while the trend in US antitrust law has moved away from per se rules, Commissioner Rosch suggested that Hong Kong-where firms were linked together even more tightly than their US counterparts and the number of overlapping directors tended to be higher-"may wish to consider emulating the United States." 163 161. Id. at 858 (emphasis added). 162. Rosch, supra note 2, at 16 (emphasis added). 163. Id. at 3.
In jurisdictions like Chile, which do not explicitly address management interlocks in their respective laws, it may still be possible to challenge particular interlocks under the general competition laws, or to analyze their effects during the course of a merger review. 164 As discussed above, however, interlocks that raise competitive concerns can arise independently of a merger or other reviewable transaction, and the general competition laws might not arise until actual anticompetitive harm has occurred. Moreover, without a bright line prohibition, the costs of dealing with problematic interlocks is likely to be higher than in the United States, where the certainty of the rule generally leads to "amicable" resolutions of those concerns. In short, the section 8 approach is far preferable to the current framework for addressing competitor interlocks in Chile-and indeed, appears to be an optimum solution overall.
CONCLUSION
Section 8 was intended "to nip in the bud incipient violations of the antitrust laws by removing the opportunity or temptation to such violations through interlocking directorates." 165 The per se test applied by the courts allows for the statute to serve its prophylactic purpose, at the same time the de minimis exemptions exclude interlocks unlikely to have an adverse effect on competition. Although section 8 may be over-or under-inclusive in certain circumstances, and does not always clearly delineate whether firms are competitors, the US experience with management interlocks shows that "real utility" can be gained when the legislature, the courts and commentators "thoughtfully address" two legal spherescorporate law and competition law-"in a unified manner." 166 A recent study conducted for the FNE on the Chilean health care market provides examples of management interlocks, both direct (with common directors between different private health insurers and private hospitals) and indirect (for example, directors of the insurers participate in two or more private hospitals, and vice versa), in an important segment of the economy. 167 While simply transplanting existing competition law approaches across jurisdictions to deal with these issues is not always a recommended exercise, in the case of management interlocks, the relevant considerations discussed above argue point in favor of adopting a US-style approach. That model, if implemented in Chile, would certainly require some adjustments to deal with certain peculiarities in the marketsuch as when an interlock should be considered to involve "competitors" in the context of the country's sprawling economic groups. And it should not be expected that such a measure would resolve the myriad enforcement issues associated with other types of structural ties between actual and potential competitors. Nevertheless, a limited ban on competitor interlocks-whether by legislation or adopted through case law by the TDLC-would be a good start, and a relatively low cost one at that. 167 . See generally PUCV, Private Healthcare Markets, supra note 7.
